

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	China	REPORT	<input type="text"/>	25X1
SUBJECT	1. Chinese Communist Railway Inspection 2. Ssufang Railway Shop, Tsingtao	DATE DISTR.	13 April 1953	
DATE OF INFO.	<input type="text"/>	NO. OF PAGES	6	
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1.  a group of Soviet railway specialists reported the results of an inspection of the Northwest Trunk Line,<sup>1</sup> the Chengtai Railway, and sections of the Lunghai Railway to senior officers of the Chinese Communist Ministry of Railways. The inspecting party was made up of Cha-kang-ta-yeh-fu (2610/1481/6671/5102/1133), a consultant; Hsi-lin (6007/2651), a bridge technician; Tsu-pu-k'o-fu (4371/1580/0668/1133), a depot and station technician; and Ao-ni-shih-k'o-fu (1159/1441/4258/0668/1133), an engineer. LU Cheng-ts'ao (0712/2973/2347), the vice minister of the Chinese Communist Ministry of Railways, accompanied the group. The principal mission of the inspection group was a survey of the Paoch'i-T'ien-shui railway and of engineering projects in T'ien-shui and Lanchow. 25X1
2. As a result of the inspection, the following criticisms were made:
  - a. Preliminary surveys of complex terrain features such as those at Wuch'iao-ling (N 37-11, E 103-01) were inadequate.
  - b. Construction and maintenance were difficult because the original plans called for a 1,160-meter tunnel with a gradient of five in 1,000; for a 90-kilometer stretch just west of the tunnel, which included gradients of 20 in 1,000 and would require the use of two locomotives; and for numerous high bridges, roadbeds, and tunnels.

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AEC
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- c. Existing roadbeds were not included in construction plans.
  - d. Engineers did not understand the earthwork problems in the construction of high roadbeds, some more than twelve meters high.
  - e. Engineers did not follow the ministry's recommendations in building roadbeds according to the "layers reinforced with piles" method.
  - f. There was a lack of coordinated development and planning. Only 38 percent of the Northwest Trunk Line, 57 percent of the earthwork for the Tienshui-Lanchow Railway, and two percent of the housing construction had been completed  25X1
  - g. There was no relationship between project development, investment, and project value.
  - h. Project price lists (sic) were not organized and there were no cost estimates.
  - i. The force of 60,000 laborers and the machinery on the Northwest Trunk Line project were not used efficiently.
  - j. WU Ko-chin (2976/0668/0036), the deputy director of the Northwest Trunk Line Engineering Administration, was unable to answer important questions raised by the inspecting party and was unable to provide a project progress chart.
  - k. Adequate data was not collected prior to the planning of bridge and tunnel construction. Bridges were constructed with arches so small that water destroyed them immediately.
  - l. Engineering personnel authorized construction modifications at will. The buttresses, structure, dimensions, and depth of the Weiho (N 34-, E 109- ) bridge were altered.
  - m. Engineers did not use construction material from the immediate area.
  - n. Engineers failed to construct embankments and structures for flood prevention work in the proper sequence, to install sufficient railings and ballast, to erect aqueducts before tunnel construction, and to provide adequate mechanized equipment. Sixty persons, each manipulating a rope, were used in place of a pile-driver to imbed reinforced concrete piles for bridge foundations.
3. The following recommendations were made:
- a. A special plan should be prepared for roadbeds twelve meters in height with specific instructions regarding the gradient of adjacent land.
  - b. The ballast for sleepers on bridges should be 20 to 25 centimeters thick.
  - c. More attention should be given to the use of signal equipment, water supply facilities, and other operational equipment.
  - d. Large depot and terminal planning should be centralized in one agency.
  - e. Engineering graduates should be assigned to large stations to study railway operations.

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f. The operational capacity of each station should be made known to the planning personnel.

4. [ ] staff employees of the Chinese Changchun Railway left Harbin for the headquarters of the Ch'engtzu-Chungking Railway to apply Soviet techniques to the operation of the railway. The group had been trained by Soviet technicians and all members had at least two years of working experience. The group included 204 members of the Mechanical Department, 155 members of the Car Department, and 126 members of the Traffic Department. 25X1

5. [ ] a passenger train transporting Chinese Communist soldiers was derailed between Anting (N 39-37, E 116-29) and Wanchuang (N 39-35, E 116-36) on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway. A few persons were injured. After the accident, the Ministry of Railways, acting on instructions from the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Government, requested regional administrations to undertake the following safety program: 25X1

- a. Shock inspections of main and side rails, switches, and connecting installations.
- b. Inspections by members of the Mechanical Department of passenger locomotives while the train is in motion.
- c. Inspection by members of the Car Department of the cars while they are in motion.
- d. Inspection of tracks and bridges by members of the Civil Engineering Department. 25X1

6. [ ] the Chinese Communist Ministry of Railways circulated to its railway administrations a preliminary general review of the "implementation of the intensified transportation plan" which was authorized by the ministry to increase the use of rolling stock.<sup>3</sup> The review [ ] contained the following statements: 25X1

- a. The average speed for both passenger and freight trains during the three-month period was greater than for August. The mileage for locomotives and day coaches increased by 20.5 kilometers and the number of 500-kilometer locomotives in service increased by 6.1 percent.
- b. Trains were on schedule 95 percent of the time.
- c. [ ], there were 164 cases of locomotive trouble, causing delays totaling 235 hours. Trains made 41,589 unsignaled stops, resulting in a total delay of 2,136 hours. Eighteen percent of the stops were in the Tientsin area. 25X1
- d. Lack of coordination of train movements resulted in too much switching, which upset schedules.
- e. Scheduling at the Fengt'ai (N 39-51, E 116-17) Railway Station was improperly done.
- f. The use of rolling stock for September was less than had been planned. This was caused by heavy scheduling of small lot shipments, insufficient freight, and an excess of military trains.

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- g. The ministry would stress improved adherence to schedules, coordination of train movements in order to assure efficient operation of the principal trains, and improvement in the preparation of records.
- h. The ministry would authorize the use of a dispatching system devised by Su-te-ni-kuo-fu (5685/1795/1441/2654/1133). The method of locomotive operation, devised by CHENG Hsi-k'un (6774/6932/0981), will be adopted to improve the skill of locomotive engineers.
- i. The ministry would re-inspect and recondition the turntable of the Hankow engineering section.
7. The Ministry of Railways assumed control of the Ssufang (N 36-07, E 120-22) Railway Shop [redacted] The Shop was used primarily for the repair of locomotives, the manufacture of freight cars, and for experimentation in locomotive development and manufacture. [redacted] the ministry instructed the Ssufang plant to undertake the production of locomotives [redacted] and to continue the production of freight cars. [redacted] the Production Department estimated a maximum production of 4.5 locomotives per month, the Mechanical Department, 3.5 locomotives per month, and the Boiler Section, eight boilers per month. Calculating on the basis of a maximum production of 3.5 locomotives per month, the ministry set the [redacted] production quota for the Ssufang plant at 24 locomotives of the "75--type". [redacted] the plant had completed 14 locomotives, of which four were declared defective and inoperable unless modified.<sup>4</sup>
8. [redacted] production figures were made known, a deputy of the Ministry of Railways and a Soviet adviser inspected the Ssufang plant. They returned to Peiping [redacted] and reported the following findings to the ministry:
- a. The management had not made adequate plant preparations for locomotive production.
- b. A large consignment of necessary supplies did not reach Ssufang until [redacted] and the manufacture of locomotives had not begun [redacted]
- c. The first locomotive was completed [redacted] The celebration commemorating the completion of the first locomotive produced in Communist China made workers forget the production schedule.
- d. The maximum time that the Mechanical Department had been able to devote to locomotive work was 5,550 man-hours per month. The ministry originally estimated that each locomotive would require 2,000 man-hours from the Mechanical Department which reduced it to 1,600 man-hours.
- e. The Ts'angk'ou (N 36-12, E 120-24) branch of the Ssufang plant was unable to assist with the lathe work.
- f. The Ssufang plant had sought assistance from other plants [redacted] but was not successful. It was necessary to use the locomotive repair branch for locomotive production. Three locomotives were at Ssufang in December in need of repairs.

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h. The cost of retaining one locomotive in the factory for one day was  
JMP 60,000,000.

i. [redacted] the cost of producing one locomotive was JMP  
2,000,000,000. The capacity monthly production of freight cars was 150.

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
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China, Nanning

1.  the railway between Laipin (N 23-42, E 109-16) and Chennankuan (N 21-58, E 106-41) had been laid only as far as the Tawankung (1129/3494/1712) station, five li west of P'inghsiang (N 22-06, E 106-44). Automobiles were used to transport passengers from Tawankung to the border of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). 25X1
2.  the Nanning branch office drafted civilian labor near P'inghsiang for work on the roadbed between Tawankung and Tayawan (1129/0068/3494) to extend the rail line five kilometers. 25X1
3.  four locomotives,  twenty-two passenger cars, fourteen 15-ton freight cars, nine 30-ton freight cars, and three 40-ton freight cars, were being used on the Laipin-Chennankuan Railway between Nanning and P'inghsiang. This section of the line was under the Nanning branch office. Shipments of supplies to the DRV and local shipments amounted to a total of 5,000 tons per month. There were about 100 passengers daily on the train from Nanning to P'inghsiang and 100 on the daily train from P'inghsiang to Nanning. 25X1

25 YEAR  
RE-REVIEW

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China, Liuchou

4. [ ] a team of railroad engineers and a team of bridge engineers 25X1  
left Hengyang for Kueiyang via Liuchou and Chinch'ingchiang (N 24-45, E 107-59).  
The transfer was ordered by the Hengyang Railway Administration. These teams 25X1  
made up part of the Kueiyang Railroad Engineering Works Bureau, established in  
order to complete the engineering survey for the Hunan-Kweichow railway which was 25X1  
to be under construction [ ]

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